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Firms often introduce damaged goods by intentionally reducing the quality of the
existing original good, even in cases producing the damaged good is more or at least
as costly as the original one. Examples are widespread in both manufacturing and
service industries: Intel 486SX microprocessor with disabled math coprocessor on
the original 486DX microprocessor, IBM LaserPrinter E with ﬁrmware slowing the
printing speed of the original LaserPrinter, Sony 64-minute recordable Minidiscs with
some recording space being disabled, stripped-down versions of computer software
(e.g. student versions with slow processing speed or functional limitations, read-
only or play-only versions of Internet media tools, and so on), and Pex and Apex
airfares with additional restrictions on normal economy fares.1 This phenomenon
is somewhat diﬀerent from the traditional quality diﬀerentiation model à la Mussa
and Rosen (1978), where goods of diﬀerent quality are treated independently and
the production cost is mostly increasing in quality. First, diﬀerentiation here comes
from degradation: ﬁrms ﬁrst develop a good of certain quality, and then introduce
damaged goods even though there is no cost savings in reducing quality.2 So, price
diﬀerences can be justiﬁed only by price discrimination not by cost diﬀerences, and
the price discrimination aspect is stronger than the standard quality diﬀerentiation.
Second, the standard quality diﬀerentiation model, which is mainly focused on en-
dogenising quality leading to the well-known downward quality distortion result,
is technically ill-suited to analyse quality degradation in the sense that it always
yields a non-diﬀerentiation solution under the cost structure characterising quality
degradation, i.e. oﬀering a single quality to a range of high-valuation consumers and
excluding all the remaining consumers.
Denekere and McAfee (1996) was the ﬁrst to formalise the phenomenon of dam-
aged goods, focusing on the static price discrimination aspect of quality degradation.
Allowing for a richer class of consumer preferences than the standard model, they
show that introducing a damaged good can be not only proﬁtable to the ﬁrm but also
Pareto-improving. As the authors pointed out, however, the condition for introduc-
ing a damaged good to be proﬁtable is somewhat unnatural and fails in many spec-
iﬁcations of the environment, including the typical linear utility structure employed
in the standard quality diﬀerentiation model.3 Roughly speaking, the proﬁtable in-
1Most of the examples cited here are taken from Denekere and McAfee (1996). See also Shapiro
and Varian (1999) for more examples.
2In fact, in some cases such as IBM LaserPrinter E, the degraded good is clearly more expensive
to produce than the original good.
3I mean by the linear utility structure that the marginal utility for quality is proportional to
1troduction of a damaged good requires high-valuation consumers suﬀer much more
from quality reduction than low-valuation consumers so that the ﬁrm can increase
the sales to low-valuation consumers without losing high-valuation consumers’ de-
mand for the original product very much.4 It naturally means that the conditions
guaranteeing a Pareto-improvement are quite stringent as well. This observation
suggests that the price discrimination role alone may not be fully satisfactory to
explain the existence of the numerous examples of damaged goods.
Using a simple model, this paper analyses a durable-goods monopolist’s incentive
for quality degradation and its welfare eﬀect in an intertemporal framework, and
compare the results with the ones obtained in the static case with non-durables.
In fact, many of the damaged-good examples introduced above can be considered
as a durable good. It is well-known that a durable-goods monopolist faces a time-
inconsistency problem. Without commitment to future pricing policy, it has the
incentive to lower the price after selling to customers with high willingness-to-pay
for the good, but this leads rational customers to postpone purchases. This time-
consistency constraint limits the ﬁrm’s monopoly power, and in its extreme form the
monopoly proﬁt goes to zero if all trade takes place in the twinkling of an eye, as
conjectured by Coase (1972) and proved formally by Bulow (1982), Stokey (1981),
and others.
In such a context, quality degradation can be used as a device to alleviate the
Coasian time-inconsistency problem under a certain condition. By introducing a
damaged good the ﬁrm induces low-valuation consumers to purchase the damaged
good early rather than waiting and buying the original good later, which allows
the ﬁrm to credibly commit not to reduce the price in the future provided there is
no upgrade possibility for the early buyers of the damaged good.5 This intertem-
poral consideration gives the ﬁrm another motivation to introduce damage goods,
in addition to the static price discrimination discovered by Denekere and McAfee
(1996). Note that the intertemporal commitment role of the damaged good is always
beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm since the monopolist would be better-oﬀ with the absence of
consumer type.
4Ambjørnsen (2002a) considers a somewhat diﬀerent case. Within the standard utility structure
as in Mussa and Rosen (1978), he shows that quality degradation may be a proﬁtable strategy
if consumers with large marginal utilities for quality to have greater outside options (i.e. high-
valuation consumers have a lower willingness-to-pay than low-valuation consumers for some low
qualities).
5Of course, there are other means and practices a durable-goods monopolist can employ to
overcome the time-inconsistency problem. See, for instance, Bulow (1986), Butz (1990), and Kuhn
and Padilla (1996).
2low-valuation consumers, while the static price discrimination can be harmful de-
pending on the consumer preference structure as mentioned above. As a result, the
durable-goods monopolist has a greater incentive to introduce a damaged good than
a static monopolist: even if the eﬀect of price discrimination on proﬁts is negative, a
durable-goods monopolist may be still willing to introduce the damaged good pro-
vided the beneﬁt from mitigating the time-consistency problem is suﬃciently large.6
However, the welfare consequence of quality degradation is less promising relative to
the static case. Quality degradation of durable goods reduces welfare if low-valuation
buyers, who would get a larger gross surplus by waiting and buying the original good
later, are induced to buy the damaged good early. In particular, we ﬁnd that the
proﬁtable introduction of the damaged good is always welfare-reducing under the
linear utility structure employed in the standard quality diﬀerentiation model. This
contrasts with the results obtained in the static model under the same parametric
speciﬁcation: the ﬁrm introduces the damaged good under very stringent conditions,
but once it is introduced a Pareto-improvement is likely to occur. The discrepancy
is mainly due to the diﬀerent ways quality degradation aﬀects low-valuation con-
sumers in the two regimes: in the static setting low-valuation buyers who would
not be served without quality degradation can consume at least the damaged good,
while in the intertemporal setting they are induced to purchase the low-quality good
early instead of buying the high-quality good later.
There is a small number of recent papers considering a durable-goods monopo-
list’s optimal product-line design in the standard quality diﬀerentiation framework.
Inderst (2002) shows that time consistency erodes the value of quality as a sorting
variable, and in the extreme case the ﬁrm may wish to serve the whole market imme-
diately. Takeyama (2002) discusses the time-inconsistency problem created by the
future upgrade possibility for the early buyers of low-end products, which may force
the ﬁr mt os t r a t e g i c a l l yb o o s tt h eq u a l i t i e so fl o w - e n dg o o d sa sam e a n so fc o m m i t -
ting to not providing future upgrades. Both authors also point out the possibility
that low-quality goods are sold below costs. Unlike those work, we assume that
quality is exogenously given as in Denekere and McAfee (1996). Rather than char-
acterising the optimal quality, we focus on investigating how the ﬁrm’s incentive for
quality degradation is related to the consumer preference structure, and how it is dif-
ferent in the static and intertemporal regimes. Furthermore and more importantly,
6In case the degraded good fails to serve as a commitment device, the incentive for quality
degradation will be smaller relative to the static case since the ﬁrm now faces an additional (in-
tertemporal) incentive constraint as will be shown later. In fact, in the present model it turns out
that the durable-goods monopolist has no incentive to introduce a degraded good in such a case.
3we are interested in the welfare consequences of quality degradation rather than its
product diﬀerentiation aspect, which is largely ignored in earlier work. On the other
hand, a sequential introduction of horizontally diﬀerentiated products may also help
the durable-goods monopolist mitigate the time-inconsistency problem by credibly
deferring sales to low-valuation buyers, as shown by Courty (1998). Also related is
the literature on product upgrades in a durable-goods monopoly, in which the main
concern is whether the ﬁrm has the socially optimal incentive for upgrades under
the time-consistency constraint (see, for example, Waldman (1993), Choi (1994), Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1998), Lee and Lee (1998), Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), and
Ambjørnsen (2002b)). In contrast, the present paper is concerned with downgrades,
which are often more cost-eﬀective than upgrades in designing a product-line.
2 The model
A simple model with two types of buyers and two transaction periods will be use-
ful to capture the main insights of quality degradation under the time-consistency
constraint.
Supply Side: A monopolist sells durable goods over two periods. The ﬁrm has an
original good of certain quality, and may introduce a damaged good at some point
of time by reducing the quality of the original good. We assume that the quality
of the damaged good is also given exogenously by some technological constraints.
The marginal production cost is constant and is given as c ≥ 0 for both goods.7 We
ignore ﬁxed costs of production, and assume that there is no possibility of upgrades
or technological innovations during the time horizon considered.
Demand Side: There are two groups of buyers with diﬀerent valuations of the
goods. A buyer has a type θ ∈ {h,l}, which is private information. There is a
continuum of buyers of each type, where the measure of type h is µ>0 and the
measure of type l is 1−µ. So, buyers act as price takers. Buyers have unit demands
for either the original or damaged good in a single period. Both goods last at most
two periods. The good purchased and used during period 1 can be used again in
period 2 without depreciation. For simplicity, we assume that after period 2 the
good becomes obsolete or is replaced by a new product. A type-θ buyer’s per-period
7It would be more natural to allow for costly degradation by assuming either some ﬁxed costs
of degradation or a higher marginal cost for the damaged good. However, introducing degradation
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where Ro and Rd each denotes the valuation ratio between the two types for the
original and the damaged good. By comparing the two ratios we can measure how
the two types of buyers react diﬀerently to the quality variation. A useful reference
is the linear utility structure employed in the standard quality diﬀerentiation model
(i.e. Ro = Rd). Then, we can say that type-h buyers suﬀer relatively more from
quality reduction than type-l buyers for the case of Ro <R d, and conversely for the
case of Ro >R d. So, we allow for a much richer class of consumer preferences which





































Figure 1: Three typical cases of the preference structure.
For simplicity, we rule out time discounting (i.e. the ﬁrm and the buyers care
much about intertemporal issues). Buyers purchase if they are indiﬀerent between
buying and not buying. We employ the following assumption in order to focus on






This assumption simply says that the valuation of the original good is suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated between the two types of buyers or the fraction of type-h buyers is
5suﬃciently large so that the monopolist, when selling the original good alone, prefers
intertemporal sales (i.e. selling to type-h buyers in the ﬁrst period and to type-l
buyers in the second period) to selling to both types of buyers in the ﬁrst period.8
3 Quality degradation under commitment
This section analyses the incentive for quality degradation when the monopolist can
make credible commitments to its future pricing and product introduction strategies.
• Equilibrium without the damaged good:
Consider ﬁrst the case where the ﬁrm does not introduce the damaged good
(selling the original good only). With commitment to future prices, this is exactly
the same as renting the original good over the two periods. The ﬁrm has two options:
sell to type-h buyers only at price 2vh and get proﬁts of µ[2vh − c],o rs e l lt ob o t h
types at price 2vl and get proﬁts of 2vl−c. Under Assumption 1, the ﬁrm will choose
the former option, and the resulting proﬁti sg i v e nb y
Π ≡ µ[2vh − c].
• Equilibrium with the damaged good:
Next consider the case where the ﬁrm introduces the damaged good. Given
that vh − vl >u h − ul,t h eﬁrm clearly wishes to induce high-valuation (type-
h) buyers to purchase the original high-quality version and low-valuation (type-l)
buyers to purchase the damaged low-quality version. Again, with commitment the
ﬁrm’s problem is the same as renting, and therefore essentially identical to the
static damaged-goods model of Denekere and McAfee (1996). Let po and pd denote
the price of the original good and the price of the damaged good. As usual in
the standard screening model, the ﬁrm will fully extract type-l buyers’ surplus by
charging p∗
d =2 ul. From the incentive constraint of type-h buyers, 2vh − po ≥
2uh − p∗
d, the optimal price for the original good is given by p∗
o =2 vh − 2(uh − ul).
8If Assumption 1 is violated, the market is cleared immediately in period 1. Then, without any
time-consistency constraint the problem essentially reduces to the static model, and the comparison
of the intertemporal and static cases is meaningless.
6All sales occur in the ﬁrst period, and the ﬁrm will optimally commit to no sales in
the second period. The resulting proﬁti s
ΠD ≡ µ[p∗
o − c]+( 1− µ)[p∗
d − c]
=2 µvh − 2(µuh − ul)− c.
Type-h buyers get net surplus of 2(uh−ul) in the equilibrium. Note that the perfect
price discrimination would be feasible if the valuation for the damaged good were the
same for both types, i.e. uh = ul.9 The following proposition summarises the ﬁrm’s
incentive for quality degradation and its welfare consequence in the commitment
regime, which is qualitatively similar to the results obtained in Denekere and McAfee
(1996) with a continuum of consumer types.
Proposition 1 With commitment to future pricing, i) the ﬁrm introduces the dam-
aged good if and only if
2(ul − µuh) > (1 − µ)c, (1)
and ii) the introduction of damaged good leads to a (weak) Pareto-improvement.10
Proof. i) Immediate from the condition ΠD > Π.
ii) The ﬁrm is certainly better-oﬀ under condition (1). Type-l buyers are in-
diﬀerent since they receive zero net surplus with the introduction of the damaged
good (full surplus extraction), as the same as the case without the damaged good
in which they in fact do not purchase any goods. Type-h buyers, however, become
strictly better-oﬀ: they get a strictly positive net surplus with the introduction of
the damaged good, while zero net surplus would be obtained without it. Hence, the
proﬁtable introduction of the damaged good is weakly Pareto-improving.
Condition (1) simply says that the proﬁt gain from selling to type-l buyers is
greater than the proﬁt loss from giving away some informational rents to type-h
9Ambjørnsen (2002a) makes a similar point in a model with diﬀerent outside options for dif-
ferent types. In fact, in the equilibrium of his model the ﬁrm always achieves the perfect price-
discrimination by choosing the quality of the degraded good at the level where the utility for the
degraded good is the same between the high and low types.
10If Assumption 1 is violated, the ﬁrm will choose to sell to both types of buyers, and get proﬁts
of 2vl − c. It can be easily shown that in this case the static monopolist introduces the damaged
good under a very strict condition similar to the one obtained here. But, quite obviously the welfare
consequence is the opposite since the damaged good has no role of expanding the market. We ignore
this uninteresting case, as in the Denekere and McAfee (19996).





i.e. the proﬁtable introduction of the damaged good requires that high-valuation
consumers suﬀer much more from quality reduction than low-valuation consumers
so that the ﬁrm can increase the sales without aﬀecting high-valuation consumers’
incentive constraint very much (i.e. without reducing the price of the original good
very much). This condition is quite stringent, as mentioned earlier. For instance,
it can be easily observed from condition (2) that quality degradation is never a
proﬁtable strategy under the linear utility structure employed in the standard qual-
ity diﬀerentiation model (i.e. Rd = Ro <µ ). However, if the damaged good is
introduced it leads to a (weak) Pareto-improvement in this case. For expositional
convenience, we will use the terms “static” and “commitment” interchangeably in
the proceeding discussion.
4 Quality degradation without commitment
Suppose now that the ﬁrm cannot commit to its future pricing and product intro-
duction strategies, and that renting is not permitted. Also, the potential buyers are
assumed to have perfect foresight on future outcomes.
4.1 The standard case without the damaged good
We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case where the monopolist does not consider intro-
ducing a damaged good, or quality degradation is prohibited by regulation. Then,
our model is basically identical to the standard durable-good monopoly model ál a
Bulow (1982).11 As usual in the literature, we use subgame perfection as our equilib-
rium concept. Under Assumption 1, the ﬁrm will induce type-h buyers to purchase
in the ﬁrst period and type-l buyers to purchase in the second period. Let p1 and p2
denote the ﬁrst-period and the second-period price of the original good. The par-
ticipation constraint of type-l buyers determines the optimal second-period price as
p∗
2 = vl. The incentive constraint of type-h buyers is then given by 2vh−p1 ≥ vh−p∗
2.
11By assuming a continuum of buyers, we rule out the perfectly discriminating equilibria proposed
by Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski (1989, 1995) (see von der Fehr and Kühn (1995) for more
details on how the relative commitment power between the seller and buyers aﬀects the equilibrium
outcome).
8So, the optimal ﬁr s t - p e r i o dp r i c ew i l lbed e t e r m i n e da tp∗
1 = vh+vl, and the resulting
Coasian proﬁti sg i v e na s
πc ≡ µ[p∗
1 − c]+( 1− µ)[p∗
2 − c]
= µvh + vl − c.
In the equilibrium, type-h buyers get net surplus of (vh − vl) and type-l buyers get
zero net surplus.
4.2 Introducing the damaged good
Since the premium a type-h buyer is willing to pay for the increase in quality of the
original good over the damaged good is higher than a type-l buyer, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd
it optimal to sell the original high-quality good to type-h buyers in the ﬁrst period
in any circumstances. Then, the introduction of the damaged good must happen
in the ﬁrst period. Introducing it in the second period, after selling the original
good to type-h buyers, is time-inconsistent (not credible). So, the only relevant
scenario here is that the ﬁr ms e l l sb o t hg o o d si nt h eﬁrst period, the original good
to type-h buyers and the damaged good to type-l buyers. Without commitment,
however, the ﬁrm may have incentives to sell the original good in the second period,
given that type-l consumers who bought the damaged good in the ﬁrst period have
replacement demands for the original good in the second period. With the damaged
good already in hand, however, their willingness to pay for the original good in the
second period is limited to the incremental valuation of the original good relative
to the damaged good (uh − ul). We have two strikingly diﬀerent results in terms
of the ﬁrm’s degradation incentive, depending on the equilibrium outcome in the
second-period subgame.
4.2.1 When vl − ul ≤ c (hardware)
This corresponds to the cases where the marginal production cost exceeds type-l
buyers’ willingness-to-pay for the replacement. So, it naturally ﬁts into hardware
markets with signiﬁcant marginal production costs. Note that it is optimal for
the ﬁrm not to sell the original good to in the second period. So, the market is
completely cleared in the ﬁrst period, and the ﬁrm does not have to worry about
time-consistency anymore.12 Then, we have the exactly same outcome as the previ-
12This extreme result is valid only in the present two-type model. With a continuum of types,
the time-inconsistency problem would still remain in some extent, even though it would be largely
relaxed by quality degradation.
9ous degradation equilibrium under commitment, and the equilibrium proﬁti sg i v e n
by
πd ≡ ΠD = µ2vh − 2(µuh − ul) − c.
Given the equilibrium prices p∗
o and p∗
d,t y p e - l buyers have no incentive to wait until
period 2 since their surplus would be fully extracted by the ﬁrm anyway in period 2.
Neither type-h buyers have incentives to wait since they could not get net surplus
larger than the one obtained in the current equilibrium. The following proposition
is immediate from the condition πd > πc.
Proposition 2 For vl −ul ≤ c,t h eﬁrm introduces the damaged good if and only if
(µvh − vl)+2 ( ul − µuh) > 0. (3)
Comparing conditions (1) and (3), it is easily observed that condition (1) is
suﬃcient for condition (3) to hold under Assumption 1. That is, if the ﬁrm would
be willing to introduce the damaged good in the static or commitment regime, it
always does in the intertemporal non-commitment regime. This is not surprising
recognising that the intertemporal commitment role of the damaged good is always
beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm. That is, the sum of the proﬁt gain from relaxing type-h
buyers’ incentive constraint and the proﬁt loss from giving up the second-period
sales of the original goods to type-l buyers (the ﬁrst term in (3)) is strictly positive
under Assumption 1. This result clearly suggests that quality degradation is more
likely to occur in the intertemporal regime compared with the static regime, and this
is mainly because the damaged good helps the ﬁrm mitigating the time-inconsistency
problem. Even if quality degradation would not be proﬁtable in the static setting, the
intertemporal monopolist has incentives to introduce the damaged good provided
t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of commitment role dominates the negative eﬀect of the price-
discrimination. For instance, the durable-goods monopolist may wish to introduce
the damaged good even if type-l buyers suﬀer relatively more from quality reduction
than type-h buyers, in which case a static monopolist never introduces the damaged
good.13
4.2.2 When vl − ul >c(software)
This is the case where the marginal production cost is so small that the ﬁrm always
has the incentive to sell the original good in the second period to type-l consumers,
13C o n d i t i o n( 3 )c a nb ew r i t t e na sRd >µ−
µvh−vl
2uh . Then, given Assumption 1 we may have the
case where µ>R o >R d >µ−
µvh−vl
2uh .
10the early buyers of the damaged goods. So, this case is more appropriate to describe
markets for software, where producing an extra unit of goods is virtually negligible.
Here the eﬀect of the second-period subgame equilibrium on the ﬁrm’s total proﬁti s
not trivial as in the previous case. Given type-l consumers’ replacement demands,
the optimal second-period price for the original good will be vl − ul.14 Then, ratio-
nally expecting the replacement possibility in the second period, type-l consumers
would not be willing to pay p∗
d for the damaged good in the ﬁrst period. In fact, the
maximal ﬁrst-period price the ﬁrm can charge for the damaged good is determined
by the type-l consumers’ per-period utility for the damaged good, ul. Similarly,
type-h consumers will rationally expect the price of the original good to decline in
the second period. Then, when choosing the ﬁrst-period price of the original good
the ﬁrm has to consider their waiting option as well as the existing static incentive
constraint:
2vh − po ≥ 2uh − ul : type-h’s static IC
and
2vh − po ≥ vh − (vl − ul): type-h’s intertemporal IC .
If vh−vl > 2(uh−ul),t h ei n t e r t e m p o r a lIC is binding and the static IC is not, and
therefore the optimal ﬁrst-period price of the original good is given as vh+(vl −ul).
Otherwise, the opposite is true, and the optimal ﬁrst-period price of the original
good is given as 2vh − (2uh − ul). It can be easily shown that the total proﬁtw i t h
quality degradation is always smaller than the Coasian proﬁti nb o t hc a s e s .
Proposition 3 For vl −ul >c ,t h eﬁrm has no incentive to introduce the damaged
good.
Proof. When the type-h buyers’ intertemporal IC is binding, the ﬁrm’s proﬁti s
given by
e πd ≡ µ(vh − ul)+vl − (2 − µ)c.
Then, we have πc − e πd ≡ µul +( 1− µ)c>0. Similarly, when the type-h buyers’
static IC is binding, the ﬁrm’s proﬁti sg i v e nb y
b πd ≡ 2µ(vh − uh)+( 1− µ)vl + µul − (2− µ)c.
Then, we have πc − b πd ≡ µ[2(uh − ul) − (vh − vl)] + µul +( 1− µ)c>0 given the
condition 2(uh − ul) >v h − vl. So, introducing the damaged good is not proﬁtable
in either case.
14We assume that type-l consumers replace the damaged good to the original good even if they
are indiﬀerent.
11Without the commitment role, the ﬁrm’s incentive for quality degradation is
smaller compared with the static case. Introducing the damaged good leads to more
sales in the ﬁrst period since it induces type-l consumers to buy the damaged good.
Without the commitment role, however, it makes both the static and the intertem-
poral incentive constraints of type-h consumers more strict, and the eﬀect of tighter
incentive constraints dominates the additional sales eﬀect. This result seems incon-
sistent with the stylised fact observed in the market for digitised information goods
(such as computer software), where quality degradation is becoming quite a com-
mon practice. One possible explanation for the discrepancy may be that replacing
software usually incurs buyers large switching costs, and so the market actually falls
i n t ot h eh a r d w a r er e g i m e( vl − ul <c ). Or, it may be that quality degradation in
software comes largely from other sources such as network externalities, as shown
by Csorba (2002), Hahn (2002a,b) and Jing (2002).
4.3 The welfare eﬀect of quality degradation
This subsection analyses the welfare implication of the proﬁtable quality degradation
in the non-commitment case. We focus on the case where the damaged good plays
the commitment role, i.e. vl−ul ≤ c. Otherwise, quality degradation is not proﬁtable
and the damaged good will not be observed. As usual, social welfare is deﬁned as the
sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts. The equilibrium of the standard case without
the damaged good yields total welfare of
W =2 µvh +( 1− µ)vl − c.
The total welfare with quality degradation is given by
Wd =2 µvh +2 ( 1− µ)ul − c.
Then, the incremental welfare due to quality degradation is given by
∆W ≡ Wd − W =( 1− µ)(2ul − vl),
and the introduction of the damaged good increases social welfare if and only if
vl < 2ul. (4)
The incremental welfare critically depends on how the type-l buyers’ gross surplus
changes according to the quality degradation, and in fact a welfare improvement re-
quires that type-l buyers’ gross surplus be larger when purchasing the damaged good
12in the ﬁrst period rather than waiting and buying the original good in the second
period. The welfare consequence of quality degradation then hinges on whether con-
dition (4) is compatible with condition (3). We formalise the result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the damaged good plays the intertemporal commitment
role (i.e. vl −ul ≤ c). Then, for Ro >R d the proﬁtable introduction of the damaged
good always reduces welfare, and for Ro <R d it can be welfare-reducing, welfare-
improving, and (weakly) Pareto-improving.
Proof. Suppose that the introduction of the damaged good is proﬁtable and















So, the proﬁtable introduction of the damaged good must be always welfare-reducing
for the case of Ro >R d, which contradicts condition (5). It is obvious from condition
( 5 )t h a tt h ep r o ﬁtable introduction of the damaged good can be compatible with
welfare improvement for the case of Ro <R d. Suppose that vh < 2uh.T h e n ,
the condition for introducing the damaged good to be proﬁtable (condition (3))
guarantees a welfare improvement (condition (4) always holds). Also, given that
vh < 2uh, a (weak) Pareto-improvement can be achieved if the incremental net
surplus of a type-h buyer due to the introduction of the damaged good is positive,
i.e.
2ul − (2uh − vh) <v l < 2ul − µ(2uh − vh).
The proﬁtable introduction of the damaged good, however, leads to a welfare reduc-
tion if condition (3) holds but condition (4) does not, i.e.
2ul <v l < 2ul + µ(vh − 2uh),
which can be realised when vh > 2uh.
Note that a reduction of total welfare implies that type-h buyers become worse-
oﬀ,s i n c et y p e - l buyers end up with zero net surplus anyway regardless of the presence
of the damaged good.
135 Static vs Intertemporal
We have a clear result in the case where the damaged good fails to play the com-
mitment role. The ﬁrm’s incentive for quality degradation is certainly smaller in
the intertemporal regime compared with the static regime. The comparison is more
interesting in the other case where the damaged good plays the intertemporal com-
mitment role. It will is useful to compare the equilibrium results in the two diﬀerent
regimes under the three typical cases of consumer preference structure.
• Ro <µ<R d: The monopolist has the incentive to introduce the damaged
good in both the static and intertemporal regimes. The welfare eﬀect of quality
degradation, however, is much less promising in the intertemporal case relative
to the static case: the introduction of the damaged good is always (weakly)
Pareto-improving in the static setting, whereas it can leads to a welfare reduc-
tion in the intertemporal setting.
• Ro <R d ≤ µ: Introducing the damaged good is never proﬁtable to the static
monopolist while it can be proﬁtable if the commitment value of the damaged
good is large enough to compensate the negative eﬀect of price discrimination.
The welfare consequence of quality degradation in the intertemporal regime
is generally ambiguous: it may reduce or increase welfare, and even lead to a
(weak) Pareto improvement.
• Rd ≤ Ro <µ : Similar to the previous case, only the intertemporal monopolist
may have the incentive for quality degradation. However, the introduction
of the damaged good always reduces social welfare. Note that this region
accommodates the standard utility structure (Rd = Ro) as a special case.
Summarising the all the comparison results above, quality degradation is more
likely to be employed by a durable-goods monopolist if it serves the intertemporal
commitment role, but its welfare consequence is much less promising compared with
the static setting.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that in a durable-goods market quality degradation can be
used as a commitment not to lower price in the future. In such a case, quality
degradation helps the ﬁrm to mitigate the Coasian time-inconsistency problem, and
14damaged goods are more likely to be observed relative to markets for non-durables.
However, quality degradation is likely to be socially undesirable when it is moti-
vated for the purpose of intertemporal commitment rather than the static price-
discrimination. Low-valuation consumers are induced to consume the low-quality
damaged good even if without the damaged good they could get larger gross sur-
pluses by waiting and purchasing the high-quality original good. This is in striking
c o n t r a s tw i t ht h es t a t i cc a s ew i t hn o n - d u r a b l e s ,w h e r et h ep r o ﬁtable introduction
of the damaged good, even though it is less likely to occur, leads to a Pareto-
improvement. Also, it has been pointed out that the intertemporal commitment role
of the damaged good crucially depends on the signiﬁcance of the marginal production
cost relative to the early (low-valuation) buyers’ willingness-to-pay for replacement,
and quality degradation of information goods such as computer software is better to
be explained by other sources (e.g. switching costs, network externalities, ...) other
than the intertemporal commitment. I hope these results can provide a testable hy-
pothesis for welfare implications of many durable and non-durable damaged goods
observed in reality.
Our analysis is restricted to the simple two-type and two-period model. Never-
theless, the main insights of our results would carry over to more general environ-
ments. First, we may consider a continuous distribution of consumer type within
the two-period framework. Again, the ﬁrm would introduce a damaged good in the
ﬁrst period (the sequential introduction is time-inconsistent). A typical equilibrium
outcome would involve potential buyers being segmented in ﬁve groups: the up-
per high-valuation group who buy the original good in the ﬁrst period, the lower
high-valuation group who buy the original good in the second period, the upper
low-valuation group who buy the damaged good in the ﬁrst period, the medium
low-valuation group who buy the damaged good in the second period, and ﬁnally
the bottom low-valuation group who buy nothing. The ﬁrm’s optimal pricing strat-
egy will be chosen to ensure the presence of the lower high-valuation group (for there
would be no commitment value of quality degradation without it), and also to dis-
courage the upper low-valuation group’s replacement demands. We could derive the
conditions for introducing the damaged good to be proﬁtable, but the complications
come in the welfare analysis and its comparison with the static case. However, we
can expect there will be at least a partial commitment role of quality degradation to
future prices and thereby helping the ﬁrm to mitigate the time-consistency problem,
a n di ns u c hac a s et h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect would be less promising due to the surplus
losses of the early buyers of the damaged good. An extension to an inﬁnite-horizon
15would also yield similar results. Without quality degradation, the typical Coase
outcome will appear (the monopolist loses his monopoly power completely) as the
length of time between the price adjustments tends to zero. Introducing a damaged
good at some point of time will increase the ﬁrm’s proﬁtb yp r e v e n t i n gt h ep r i c e
for the original good from dropping to its lowest possible level. Finally, it would be
interesting to consider the possibility of technological innovation (or new product
introduction) together with quality degradation, and investigate the interaction be-
tween downgrades and upgrades in a uniﬁed framework. Ambjørnsen, T. (2002b)
takes a ﬁrst step towards this direction.
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